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Abstract1 
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approaches and directions for future research.   
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Introduction 
Microsimulation models (msm) are tools that allow the simulation of the effects of a policy, on 
a sample of economic agents (individual, households, firms) at the individual level. This 
approach to policy evaluation is based on the representation of the economic environment of 
individual agents, their budget constraint in particular, and, possibly, their behaviour. A 'policy 
simulation' then consists of evaluating the consequences of a change in the economic 
environment induced by a policy reform on a vector of indicators of the activity and/or welfare 
for each individual agent in a sample of observations.   
The microsimulation approach in economics imitates the experimental approach in biology or 
psychology.  Yet, a major difference is that experimentation in the latter disciplines relies on 
the comparison of observed state and behaviour of the agents being studied before and after a 
change in their environment has been imposed to them. In economics, the simulation bears 
only on the change in the environment and on 'imputed' changes in behaviour or welfare. The 
comparison is thus made on an ex-ante basis rather than ex-post. To be sure, ex-post 
evaluations are also possible in economics and the field of 'impact evaluation' is growing 
quickly – see Duflo (2003).  However, this approach often is too cumbersome, costly and time 
consuming for real time policy analysis. Even though much more handy, the use of msm in 
economics as a tool for the analysis and support for public decision-making processes started 
to developing only recently. In 1957, Orcutt2 planted the seed of microsimulation as an 
instrument for economic analysis, but it is only since the early 1980s that the use of msm 
developed, undoubtedly as a consequence of the increasing availability of large and detailed 
datasets on individual agents and the continuous increase in, and falling cost of, computing 
power3. 
The importance and usefulness of microsimulation techniques in the analysis of public policies 
comes from two aspects. First and foremost, is the possibility of fully taking into account the 
heterogeneity of economic agents as they are observed in micro-data sets. Working with some 
“typical agents” (i.e. typical households or typical firms) often is the first approach to 
evaluating the impact of fiscal and social policies. It certainly gives a general idea about the 
consequences of the reform being analysed but it can hide unexpected effects arising with 
                                                 
2 See Orcutt (1957), Orcutt, Greenberger, Korbel and Rivlin (1961), Orcutt, Merz and Quinke (1986). 
3 For a detailed description of the “history” and developments of microsimulation in economic analysis, see 
Atkinson and Sutherland (1988), Merz (1991), Citro and Hanusheck (1991), Harding (1996), Gupta and Kapur 
(2000).  
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certain combinations of individual characteristics that could not be apprehended through 
'typical cases'. In addition, even when various 'typical cases' are considered, it is never clear 
how representative they actually are. Working with thousands of actual economic agents rather 
than a few hypothetical ones permits avoiding these two difficulties. In particular, it permits 
identifying with precision who are likely to be the winners and losers of a reform. Such 
information is indeed crucial to evaluate the overall welfare effect of the reform as well as 
political economy factors that may hamper its implementation. The second aspect concerns the 
possibility of accurately evaluating the aggregate financial cost/benefit of a reform. The results 
obtained with an msm at the level of individual agents can be aggregated at the macro level 
allowing the analyst to evaluate the effect of the policy on the government budget constraint. 
Clearly, the standard 'typical case' approach could not permit such an accurate evaluation of the 
budgetary cost of a policy reform.  
Because of these strong advantages over the 'representative agent' approach, and also because 
of continuing progresses in data availability and computing facility, the microsimulation 
approach to economic policy analysis is bound to intensify and to deepen. At the same time, 
better data and more powerful machines and software enabling analysts to conduct more and 
more complicated calculations are likely to modify the nature of microsimulation exercises. 
This process is indeed under way. Not only do micro-data occupy today a space in applied 
economic analysis that has become considerable but also they are giving rise to more and more 
sophisticated treatment. The purpose of this paper is to review that evolution and to point to the 
most promising directions for further development of microsimulation techniques. It does so by 
focusing on redistribution policies, a domain of application of microsimulation that has been 
particularly active during the last two decades.  
 
1. A taxonomy of microsimulation models applied to redistribution policies 
The common structure of msm in redistribution analysis comprises three elements: 1) a micro 
dataset, containing the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of a sample of 
individuals or households; 2) the rules of the policies to be simulated - i.e. the budget 
constraint faced by each agent; 3) a theoretical model of the behavioural response of agents. 
Existing msm differ essentially with respect to this last dimension.  Behavioural responses 
which may be of relevance in connection with redistribution policies, include labour supply, 
savings and household family composition –i.e. marriage/partnership, cohabitation of children, 
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fertility. A clear taxonomy may be established according to whether some of these behavioural 
responses are included or not in the analysis, the time dimension of these responses and the 
partial versus general equilibrium focus of the analysis. 
Msm that ignore behavioural responses altogether are sometimes called arithmetical models. 
This type of model simply applies the change in the budget constraint that households face 
because of the reform in redistribution policy without taking into account any change in their 
market income and in their demographic composition. Based on market incomes and the socio-
demographic characteristics of a household, they arithmetically derive its disposable income 
and net tax payments given the rules for the computation of taxes and benefits in the policy 
being analysed. The simplicity of these models is rather appealing, even though it must be kept 
in mind that the computation of taxes and benefits in most advanced redistribution systems 
requires a few thousands of lines of code.   
Behavioural msm include a detailed representation of the behavioural response of individuals 
and households to changes in their budget constraint. The type of behaviour taken into account 
differs across models, even though consumption and labour supply are the most frequent focus 
of interest. Given the system of pre-tax prices and wage rates, and given the shape of the 
budget constraint, behavioural msm compute the optimal consumption demand and labour 
supply of each agent. To do so, a model of consumption and labour supply must have been 
estimated, or possibly 'calibrated', and must be incorporated in the msm framework. Of course, 
the availability of such a model allows for a more detailed analysis of household welfare and 
the aggregate budget constraint of the redistribution authority.  
The time dimension of msm depends on the object of the analysis and the kind of behavioural 
response that is incorporated in the model. For instance, evaluating the effects of a reform of 
the income tax that would modify the treatment of children will have little effects on household 
composition in the short-run. An arithmetical msm will then be sufficient. Long-run effects, 
however, require simulating the impact on fertility decisions of the tax reform. A dynamic 
framework may then become necessary where households are followed over time.  Likewise, 
the microsimulation of changes in the parameters of the tax-benefit system that affect inter-
temporal consumption allocation, retirement, training, schooling of the children, etc., must be 
analysed with dynamic msm rather than the static models defined earlier.  
The final dimension along which msm may differ has to do with the partial equilibrium 
approach implicit in considering that behavioural responses have no impact on the price 
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system. If labour supply effects arising from a reform of the tax-benefit system are large 
enough, changes in the structure of wages and prices may be expected to take place. Most 
models ignore these general equilibrium effects and may thus be called 'partial equilibrium' 
models. However, msm that take into account general equilibrium effect are also being 
developed. Some of them may be related to the now prolific Computable General Equilibrium 
literature and essentially try to link these sectoral models to a household micro-data base. 
Others limit themselves to a subset of markets, most often the labour market. 
It would also be possible to establish a taxonomy of msm on the basis of their field of 
application in the broad area of redistribution policies: indirect taxation, direct taxation, social 
security systems, non-contributory benefits, etc. As the objective of the present paper is more 
methodological than policy oriented, it seemed more effective to hold on to the preceding 
taxonomy. The rest of this paper is devoted to a review of the preceding types of models and 
the use made of them, the emphasis being put on the economic assumptions they implicitly or 
explicitly rely on, and on the appropriate way of interpreting their results.   
 
2. Arithmetical microsimulation and tax incidence analysis. 
As said earlier, arithmetical msm in the redistribution field simulate the change in the real 
disposable income, of individuals or households due to a change in the rules for calculating tax 
or benefit payments under the assumption that individual behaviour is unchanged. Thus, the 
effect of an increase in the indirect tax rate on good i for individual j is to reduce the 'real' 
disposable income of j by an amount equal to the change in the final price caused by the tax 
times the consumption of good i by that individual. Likewise, the effect of a reform of the 
income tax is the change in the real disposable income that it generates for constant market 
income from labour or other sources. Under these assumptions, it is a simple matter, at least 
conceptually, to identify the winners or losers of any reform of the tax-benefit system and to 
compute how much every one loses or gains in terms of real disposal income.  
The assumption of unchanged behaviour has often been criticised by potential users. It is 
important to realize, however, that it is not as restrictive as it would appear. Under some 
conditions, they are fully consistent with the existence of behavioural responses. They simply 
give an estimate of the first round effect, which is itself a good approximation of final welfare 
effect if changes are small enough and individuals may be thought to operate in perfect 
markets. This is in direct application of the well-known envelope theorem as is shown below.  
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- Theoretical justification of arithmetical microsimulation 
The familiar utility theory of consumer behaviour provides a simple income metric of a change 
in welfare due to any modification of the budget constraint. To measure a household’s welfare 
gains and losses from a reform define Vi(p, yi) as the indirect utility function of that household 
(indexed  i) :  
{ }iiiiiMiMii ypxxUArgypxwithypxpypV ≤==   s.t.  )( max),(),(.),(  (1) 
where yi is household i’s income, p the price vector that it faces, Ui(x) its direct utility function, 
and xM(p, yi) its vector of Marshallian demand functions.  
The welfare effect of a public policy affecting marginally household i's income at constant 
prices p is given by i
i
i yVV y ∆=∆  where iyV  is its marginal utility of income. Inverting this 
expression, one may express any change in the welfare of individual i in terms of an 
'equivalent' variation of income, *iy∆ : 
i
ii y
VVy /* ∆=∆          (2) 
In other words, there is complete equivalence between the change in the welfare income 
metric, *iy∆ , and the change in welfare once a value has been selected for the marginal utility 
of income i
y
V . However, the latter is essentially unobserved and has therefore to be chosen 
arbitrarily on a purely normative basis.  
Consider now a policy change that affects the price vector p. Differentiating the indirect utility 
function yields:  
∑ ∆=∆
j
jiji pVV          (3) 
where ijV  is  the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to the price pj.  From the 
envelope theorem, or Sheppard's lemma or Roy theorem, it is known that:  
),(. i
Mi
j ypxVV jy−=          (4) 
Replacing in (3) and using the welfare income metric definition (2), it comes that the change in 
the price vector p∆ causes a change in the welfare of individual i that is equivalent to a change 
in income given by:  
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 ∑ ∆−=∆
j
j
i
ji pxy
*          (5) 
where ijx  is the actual consumption of good j by household i.  
The preceding equation fully justifies the arithmetical microsimulation approach. It indeed 
implies that the change in the welfare income metric due to a change in price is simply equal to 
the change in the cost of the consumption basket due to the price change, p∆ . This result 
generalizes easily to the case where the 'consumption' vector, x, also includes labour supply or 
possibly the production of certain goods by the household itself. In this more general case, call 
0
iy  the income of household i which is truly exogenous, that is income not coming from labour 
or from the sale of goods. The preceding argument implies that:  
 
∑ ∆+∆−=∆
j
ij
i
ji ypxy
0*         (6) 
where ijx  is now to be interpreted as the 'net' demand of good - or labour service - j by the 
household. Then, imagine a change in the tax-benefit system that affects the price the 
household receives for the goods and services it sells on the market, its exogenous income 
0
iy and possibly the price of the goods that it consumes. The preceding expression shows that 
the change in the welfare of agent i may be obtained by applying the new price system 
generated by the reform of the tax-benefit system to the initial bundle of consumption, 
production and labour supply of the agent. This is exactly the assumption behind the 
arithmetical microsimulation approach. Since the preceding argument only applies at the 
margin, it can be shown moreover that the same reasoning applies when the price system is 
non-linear, as it is practically the case with tax-benefit systems in most developed countries – 
through instruments like progressive income taxes or means-tested benefits.  
According to the preceding argument, it is therefore erroneous to present arithmetical msm as 
based on the assumption that agents' behaviour is totally rigid. In effect, this approach to the 
evaluation of policy reforms is fully consistent with the existence of behavioural responses. 
The point is simply that these responses may be ignored when evaluating individual change in 
welfare levels, provided some specific conditions hold. These include in particular that: a) the 
reform is causing only 'marginal' changes in the budget constraint faced by agents; b) all agents 
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are optimising under their sole budget constraint, which implies that all markets are perfect in 
the sense that agents are never rationed.  
If the preceding argument justifies that arithmetical msm may ignore behavioural responses 
when evaluating changes in individual and social welfare, it does not offer the same 
justification when evaluating changes in tax revenues or benefit payments due to a reform. The 
envelope theorem cannot be invoked in that case and it is simply not true that raising the tax 
rate on a specific good will increase revenues proportionally to the initial consumption of that 
good. Thus, arithmetical msm do not permit taking rigorously into account the budget 
constraint of the government, when strong behavioural responses to a reform are expected.    
Other sources of inaccuracy are present in the arithmetical msm approach4. The first comes 
from the assumption, often made when using arithmetical msm for tax-incidence analysis, that 
tax changes are completely passed on to consumers prices or net wages. This would be true 
only in the case of a long-run competitive market equilibrium (an hypothesis that may 
sometimes be far from reality). To be fully rigorous, some type of partial or general 
equilibrium model taking into account the production side of the economy should be used to 
determine the way in which a change in the tax system translates into changes in consumer or 
producer prices and in wage rates. 
Tax evasion and non take-up of the benefits are other important sources of inaccuracy in 
arithmetical msm.  These models are normally built under the hypothesis that taxpayers report 
all their incomes and that any household entitled to a certain benefit actually cashes it. In 
reality, tax evasion often is common practice. Likewise, some households do not ask for social 
assistance even though they are entitled to it by the law5. This may occur for multiple reasons 
including lack of information, social stigma, complexity of the administrative procedures, etc. 
Reciprocally, some household may be receiving benefits, although they do not qualify for 
them, because of information problems in the management of the system.6 Tax evasion and 
non take-up could be dealt with without too much difficulty if it could be assumed they would 
not be affected by a reform of the tax-benefit system. It would be sufficient to observe this 
phenomenon in the database used for the simulation. This is unlikely, however. Increasing 
                                                 
4 See the list established by Sahn and Younger (2003) for applications of this approach to the incidence of indirect 
taxation.  
5 About the take-up problem see: Hancock, Pudney and Sutherland, (2003) “Using Econometric Models of Benefit 
Take-up by British Pensioners in Microsimulation Models” paper presented the conference: “International 
Microsimulation Conference on Population, Ageing and Health: Modelling Our Future” held in Canberra-
Australia- in December 2003. 
6 See Duclos 1995a, 1995b, 1997 and Duclos et al. (2004). 
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income tax rates is making tax evasion more profitable, other things equal, and increasing a 
benefit is making non take-up more costly. In other words, tax evasion and benefit take-up may 
be part of the behavioural responses that are ignored in the arithmetical msm approach.  
- Examples of application 
There is an extensive literature on the application of arithmetical msm techniques to the 
analysis of reforms of tax-benefit systems. Atkinson and Sutherland (1988), Merz (1991), Citro 
and Hanusheck (1991), Harding (1996), Sutherland (1998), Gupta and Kapur (2000), among 
others, offer surveys of msm and their use in Europe and United States7. Tax incidence 
analysis, as well as the analysis of the incidence of public spending in areas like education or 
health also belongs to the arithmetical msm tradition. There is an extensive literature in that 
area (see for instance Creedy, 1999, and Sahn and Younger, 2003 in the case of tax incidence 
and Demery, 2003, in the case of public spending). Particular attention has been given in 
Europe to the analysis of policy reforms at national and European level, with a special interest 
for the issue of the harmonization of tax and social policies. For example, Atkinson, 
Bourguignon and Chiappori (1988) analyse the effect on a given sample of French households 
from replacing the French by the British tax-benefit system. De Lathouwer (1996) simulates 
the implementation of the unemployment benefit scheme enforced in the Netherlands, on a 
sample of Belgian households, shedding light on the importance of the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the population for the performance of a redistributive system. Callan and 
Sutherland (1997) compare the effects of different types of fiscal and social policies on the 
welfare of households in certain EEC countries. Bourguignon et al. (1997) use a 
microsimulation model to simulate the effects of the enforcement of the same child benefit 
scheme on the populations of France, the UK and Italy, whereas Atkinson et al. (2002) analyse 
the effect of introducing universal minimum old-age income in a larger number of European 
countries.8    
By definition, msm  models provide information on the way every individual or household in a 
sample is affected by a reform in the redistribution system. This allows identifying precisely 
the gainers and the losers of a reform, and their characteristics. In general, however, 
                                                 
7  See also the papers presented at the conference: “International Microsimulation Conference on Population, 
Ageing and Health: Modelling Our Future” held in Canberra-Australia- in December 2003. The papers can be 
downloaded at the Web address:  http://www.natsem.canberra.edu.au/conference/papers/index.html 
8 The preceding studies all rely on Euromod, an ambitious microsimulation model that covers the 15 EU members 
For a detailed description and other applications of this model, see Sutherland (2001) and the website: 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm 
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information at the individual level must be aggregated in order to be of some policy 
significance. Typically, individuals or households are grouped by socio-demographic 
characteristics or by initial level of real income or welfare. Changes in their disposable income 
due to the reform being analysed is given for these various groups. In addition, most models 
also provide changes in several social welfare indicators computed on the whole population. 
These include not only the mean disposable income per adult equivalent but also a number of 
inequality indices (Gini, Theil, Atkinson measures with varying inequality aversion 
parameters), several poverty measures, and the application of relative or absolute Lorenz 
dominance criteria.9 Spadaro (2005) provides a good illustration of international welfare-based 
comparisons of tax-benefit systems relying on the arithmetical msm approach. 
Several models also provide information on the distribution of the 'effective marginal tax rates' 
in the population, defined as the additional disposable income resulting from an additional 
currency unit of market income after taking into account changes in taxes and benefits. 
Although no behavioural response is taken into account in the model, these marginal tax rates 
give information on the labour supply incentives associated with a particular tax-benefit 
system. Changes in these marginal tax rates are thought to give some rough idea of the effect of 
a reform on incentives and therefore of the likely size of the behavioural response.10   
 
3. Behavioural microsimulation models and social welfare analysis.  
As indicated in the previous section, ignoring behavioural reactions can lead to misleading 
results in several situations. The first part of this section is devoted to a discussion of the way 
in which behavioural response may be introduced in msm. The second part is devoted to 
several applications of these models to social welfare analysis.  
- Building a behavioural msm 
As arithmetical models, behavioural msm rely on micro household databases. Nevertheless, 
they add an important component to the analysis. The point is not only to count how much 
more, or less, everyone is receiving or paying because of a reform in his/her budgets constraint 
but to take into account the behavioural response of the agents to this change in the budget 
constraint. This may be done through the estimation of a structural econometric model on the 
cross-section of households available in the survey being used and/or through the calibration 
                                                 
9 For a complete survey on welfare dominance theory, see Lambert (1993). 
10 See Bourguignon, Chiappori and Hugounenq (1993). 
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of a behavioural model with some predetermined structure so as to make it consistent with 
behaviour actually observed in the survey, and meant to correspond to the status quo.  
Tax-benefit models with labour supply response are the archetypical example of behavioural 
msm. Changes in the tax-benefit system in these models affect the budget constraint of 
households. They modify their disposable income with unchanged labour supply, but through 
the corresponding income effects, and also through changes in the after tax price of labour, 
they also modify labour supply decisions. By how much is determined through simulating a 
model of labour supply behaviour. 
The behavioural msm approach thus comprises three steps: specifying the logical economic 
structure of the model being used, estimating or calibrating the model and simulating it with 
alternative reforms of the tax-benefit system. These steps are considered in turn.11  
- The standard continuous modelling of labour supply 
The logical economic structure is that of the textbook utility maximizing consumer. An 
economic agent, i, with characteristics zi chooses his/her volume of consumption, ci, and 
his/her labour supply, Li, so as to maximize his/her preferences represented by the utility 
function u( ) under a budget constraint that incorporates the whole tax-benefit system. 
Formally, this is represented by: 
Max  u(ci, Li; zi; β, εi )   s.t.   ci ≤ y0i + wiLi+ NT( wiLi, Li, y0i; zi; γ),  Li ≥ 0  (7) 
In the budget constraint, y0i stands for (exogenous) non-labour income, wi for the wage rate and 
NT() for the tax-benefit or 'net tax' schedule. Taxes and benefits depend on the characteristics 
of the agent, his/her non-labour income and his /her labour income, wiLi. It may also depend 
directly on the quantity of labour being supplied, as in workfare programs. γ stands for the 
parameters of the tax-benefit system  - various tax rates, means-testing of benefits, etc.. 
Likewise, β and εi are coefficients that parameterise preferences, the latter being idiosyncratic. 
The solution of that program yields the following labour supply function: 
Li = F(wi, y0i; zi; β, εi; γ)   (8)  
This function is  non-linear. In particular, it is equal to zero in some subset of the space of its 
arguments – i.e. the non-participation solution.  
                                                 
11 The most basic methodological reference for this approach is the pioneering work by Hausman (1980, 1981, 
1985).  
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Suppose now that a sample of agents is observed in some household survey. The problem is to 
estimate the function F( ) above, or, equivalently, the preference parameters, β and εi, since all 
the other individual-specific variables or tax-benefit parameters are actually observed. To do 
so, preference parameters are broken down into a set of coefficients β common to all agents, 
and a set εi that is idiosyncratic. The latter plays the usual role of the random term in standard 
regressions.  
Estimation proceeds as with standard models, minimizing the role of the idiosyncratic 
preference term in explaining cross-sectional differences in labour supply. This leads to a set of 
estimates βˆ for the common preference parameters and iεˆ for the idiosyncratic preference 
terms. By definition of the latter, it is true for each observation in the sample that:  
γ);ε,β ;y , w,F(z  L i0iiii ˆˆ=    (9)    
It is now possible to simulate alternative tax–benefit systems. This simply requires modifying 
the set of parameters γ.12  In absence of general equilibrium effects, the change in labour 
supply due to moving to the set of parameters γs is given by:  
γ);ε,β ;y , w,F(z)γ;ε,β ;y , w,F(z  LL i0iii
s
i0iiii
s
i ˆˆˆˆ −=−   (10)    
The change in the disposable income may also be computed for every agent. It is given by:  
γ);z;L,Lw,NT(y)γ;z;L,Lw,NT(y)L(LwCC iiii0i
s
i
s
i
s
ii0ii
s
iii
s
i
−+−=−            (11) 
Then, one may also derive changes in any measure of individual welfare.  
Several difficulties in the preceding model must be emphasized at the outset. Its estimation 
generally is uneasy. It is highly non-linear because of the non-linearity of the budget constraint 
and possibly its non-convexity due to the tax-benefit schedule, NT( ), and corner solutions at  
Li=0. Functional forms must be chosen for preferences, which may introduce some 
arbitrariness in the whole procedure. Finally, it may be feared that imposing full economic 
rationality and a functional form for preferences severely restrict the estimates that are 
obtained. There has been a debate on this point ever since the first model of this type - due to 
Hausman (1980) appeared in the literature – see in particular MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch 
(1990). 
                                                 
12 Assuming indeed a structural specification of the NT( ) function general enough for all reforms to be 
represented by a change in parameters γ. 
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-  Using discrete choice models of labour-supply  
It turns out that simpler and less restrictive specifications may be used, which considerably 
weaken the preceding critiques. In particular, specifications used in recent work consider 
labour supply as a discrete variable that may take only a few alternative values, and evaluate 
the utility of the agent for each of these values and the corresponding disposable income given 
by the budget constraint. As before, the behavioural rule is then simply that agents choose the 
value that leads to the highest level of utility. However, the utility function may be specified in 
a very general way, with practically no restriction. Such a representation is therefore as close as 
possible to what is revealed by the data.   
Formally, a specification that generalizes what is most often found in the recent tax and benefit 
labour supply literature is the following:  
jk),ε; β, c;wf(zU),ε; β, c;wf(zUDL ki
kk
iii
k
i
j
i
jj
iii
j
iji ≠=≥==  allfor    if     (12) 
where Dj is the duration of work in the jth alternative and jiU the utility associated with that 
alternative, jic  being the disposable income given by the budget constraint in (7):    
j
ic  = y0i + wi .Li + NT(wi Dj, Dj, y0i; zi; γ)   (13) 
When the function f( ) is linear with respect to its common preference parameters, βj, additive 
with respect to the idiosyncratic terms, jiε , and when those terms are iid with a double 
exponential distribution, this model is the standard multinomial logit. It may also be noted that 
it encompasses the initial model (7). It is sufficient to make the following substitution:  
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This specification, which involves restrictions across the various work duration alternatives, is 
actually the one that is most often used.13 
Even under its more general form, the preceding specification might be still found to be 
restrictive because it relies on some utility maximizing assumption. Two remarks are important 
at this respect. First, it must be clear that ex-ante incidence analysis of tax-benefit systems 
cannot dispense with such a basic assumption. The ex-ante nature of the analysis requires some 
assumption to be made about the way agents choose between alternatives. The assumption that 
                                                 
13 For an extensive discussion of these specifications, see Bargain (2004). 
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agents maximize some criterion defined in the most flexible way across alternatives is not 
really restrictive. Second, it must be clear that, if no restriction is imposed across alternatives, 
then the utility maximizing assumption is compatible with the most flexible representation of 
the way in which labour supply choices observed in a the survey are related to individual 
characteristics, including the wage rate and the disposable income defined by the tax-benefit 
system, NT( ).   
That model (12) can be interpreted as representing utility maximizing behaviour is to some 
extent secondary, although this permits of course implementing counterfactual simulations in a 
simple way. More important is that this model fits the data as closely as possible. Interestingly 
enough, the only restriction with respect to that objective in the general expression (12) is the 
assumption that the utility associated with each alternative depends on the wage rate and the 
non-labour income of an individual only through jic , that is the disposable income given by the 
budget constraint and the tax-benefit schedule, NT( ).14 The economic structure of this model 
thus lies essentially in the way in which the income effect is specified. If it were not for that 
property, it would simply be a reduced from model aimed at fitting the data as well as possible.  
In effect, the restriction that the income effect must be proportional to disposable income 
seems to be a minimal assumption to ensure this representation of cross-sectional differences in 
labour supply behaviour is consistent with elementary rationality. This remark also makes 
perfectly clear that, within this framework, the simulated effect of a reform of the tax-benefit 
system, NT( ), on individual labour supply is estimated on the basis of observed  cross-
sectional differences in disposable income in the status quo.  
The role of idiosyncratic terms, iεˆ  or jiεˆ , in the whole approach must not be downplayed. 
They represent the unobserved heterogeneity of agents' labour supply behaviour. Thus, they 
may be responsible for some heterogeneity in responses to a reform of taxes and benefits. It 
may be seen in (14) that agents who are otherwise identical might react differently to a change 
in disposable incomes, despite the fact that these changes are the same for all of them. For this, 
it is sufficient that the idiosyncratic terms, jiεˆ , be sufficiently different. Some will modify 
their work duration due to a tax-benefit reform, wile others will not.    
                                                 
14 Of course, it is also necessary to check that utility is monotonically increasing with disposable income for this 
general specification to make any sense.  
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Estimates of the idiosyncratic terms result directly from the econometric estimation of the 
common preference parameters, βˆ  in the continuous specification (9) or jiβˆ  in the discrete 
model (12) . These are standard regression residuals in the former case and so-called 'pseudo-
residuals' in the latter.  However, one may also opt for a “calibration” rather than an 
econometric estimation approach. With the former, some of the coefficients βˆ  or jiβˆ  are not 
estimated but given arbitrary values deemed reasonable by the analyst.  Then, as in the 
standard estimation procedure, estimates of the idiosyncratic terms are obtained by imposing 
that predicted choices, under the status quo, coincide with actual choices.  
It is important to emphasize that there is some ambiguity about who the “agents” behind the 
standard labour supply model (7) should be. Traditionally, the literature considers 'individual 
agents', even though the welfare implications of the analysis concern households. Extending 
the model to households requires considering simultaneously the labour supply decision of all 
members at working age. This makes the analysis more complex. It becomes practically 
intractable with the continuous representation - see, for instance, Hausman and Ruud (1994) - 
but only lengthens computation time with the discrete approach.  
- Illustrative applications of behavioural msm  
Applications of the preceding models now are numerous. they are surveyed in Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999) and in Creedy and Duncan (2002). The discrete approach underlined above is 
best illustrated by van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996) or Keane and Moffitt (1998). An 
application of the 'calibration' approach may be found in Spadaro (2005).  
A nice application of behavioural msm, that illustrates very well the potential of this approach, 
is the work of Blundell et al. (2000) that evaluates the likely effect of the introduction of the 
Working Families Tax Credit (WTFC) in UK.  They estimate, separately, a discrete labour 
supply model for married couples and single parents, on a sample of UK households coming 
from the Family Resources Survey of 1995 and 1996. Then they use the estimated model to 
simulate the labour supply responses under the new budget constraint using the TAXBEN msm 
developed at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The results of the analysis show that the 
introduction of behavioural responses reduces the estimated cost of the WFTC programme in 
the purely arithmetical scenario by 14%. This is mostly due to the increase in the labour force 
participation of single mothers and the subsequent increase in tax receipts.     
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Similar analysis has been implemented for the evaluation of recent tax reforms in the US 
(Keane and Moffit 1998 and Hoynes 1996), in the Netherlands (Das and Van Soest 2000), in 
France (Bargain 2004b), in Germany (Bonin, Kempe and Schneider 2002), in Italy (Aaberge et 
al. 1998b) and in Spain (Labeaga, Oliver and Spadaro 2005). 
In addition to labour supply and consumption patterns15, there are other dimensions of 
household behaviour mattering from a welfare point of view and that may be affected by tax-
benefit systems. Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil and similar “conditional 
cash transfer programs” in several other countries, offer a clear example of policies in 
developing countries that can be evaluated ex ante by behavioural msm.16  
To have an idea of the possible application of behavioural msm to this type of policies consider 
the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil, a component of the broader program Bolsa Familia. It 
consists of a cash transfer to households whose income per capita is below a threshold of 90 
Reais – approximately 45 US $ - per month and with child at schooling age, conditionally on 
these children effectively attending school. The monthly transfer is equal to 15 Reais per child 
going to school but it is limited to 45 Reais per household. This may be considered as a 
'conditional cash transfer program' because it combines cash transfers based on a means-test 
and some additional conditionality – i.e. having children at school age actually going to school. 
As the main occupational alternative to school is work, this really is a labour supply problem 
similar to the one analysed above. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) estimate a multilogit 
model of schooling and labour supply for all children aged 10 to 15 in households surveyed in 
the Brazilian household survey, PNAD in a year preceding the implementation of the program. 
As above, the identification condition in that model is that the way children earnings and the 
income of other household members enter the utility of the various alternatives is uniquely 
through the disposable income of the whole family. After estimating the model of labour 
supply-schooling decision without conditional cash transfers, the Bolsa Escola program was 
simulated on each of the households in PNAD.  The results show that the program is indeed 
effective in reducing the number of poor children not going to school, much more than what 
                                                 
15 See Symons and Warren (1996). 
16 Those programs may also be evaluated ex-post through impact evaluation techniques. Progresa, the ancestor of 
Oportunidades, has been the object of very careful evaluation. For detailed information, see the website of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute:  http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm 
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would result from an unconditional means-tested cash transfer. However, its effect on poverty 
turned out to be rather limited due to the limited overall size of the program.17  
Before moving to some other possible applications of the preceding framework, some 
limitations must be stressed. First, it has to be recognized that this approach is difficult to 
implement because it generally requires the estimation of an original behavioural model that 
fits the policy to be evaluated or designed, and of course the corresponding micro data. 
Because of this, it is unlikely that an analysis conducted in a given country for a particular 
policy can be applied without substantial modification to another country or in the same 
country to another type of policy. The methodological investment behind this approach may 
thus be important. This justifies applying first a pure arithmetical microsimulation approach or 
a simpler behavioural model based on calibration. Second, the fact that the behavioural 
approach relies necessarily on a structural model that requires some minimal set of 
assumptions is to be emphasized. In general, there is no way these assumptions may be tested. 
In the labour supply model with a discrete choice representation, the basic assumption is that 
wage and non-labour income variables matter for occupational decisions only through the net 
disposable income they command, as given by the tax-benefit system. On the contrary, a 
reduced form model would be based independently on wage and non-labour income. 
Econometrically, the difference may be tenuous but the implications in terms of 
microsimulation results of specific policies may be huge. Finally, the strongest assumption is 
that cross-sectional income effects, as estimated on the basis of a standard household survey, 
coincide with the income effects that will be produced by the program or the reforms under 
study. In other words, time income effects for a given agent are assumed to coincide with 
observed cross-sectional income differences. Here again, this is an hypothesis that is hard to 
test and yet absolutely necessary for ex-ante analysis. Nothing is possible without it. The only 
test one can think of would be to combine ex-ante and ex-post analysis. For instance, one could 
try to run some ex-ante analysis on a household survey taken prior to the implementation of the 
reform and then compare with the results obtained in the ex-post evaluations that have been 
                                                 
17 A similar exercise has been made to evaluate ex-ante the Progresa program in Mexico by Todd and Volpin 
(2002) and by Attanasio et al. (2003). In both case, the modelling framework includes dynamic features and is 
more sophisticated. Earlier attempts at micro-simulating the effects of educational policies on schooling include 
Gertler and Glewwe (1990) - see also Younger (2002). Overall, however, it is somewhat remarkable that little ex-
ante analysis of such programs is performed in developing countries.  
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made of that program. Coincidence would support the assumption that cross-sectional and time 
individual specific income effects are identical.18  
Because of some possibly strong assumptions there unavoidably is some uncertainty about the 
prediction that come out of ex-ante incidence analysis based on behavioural msm. This being 
said, such a tool is absolutely necessary in order to reflect on the optimal design of policies the 
most likely to generate strong behavioural responses.  
- Behavioural msm and applied optimal redistribution theory  
Including behavioural response in a msm framework allows for an explicit analysis of the 
equity-efficiency trade-off in the spirit of standard optimal redistribution analysis. In 
arithmetical models, that analysis could be performed only in a very indirect way, for instance 
comparing social welfare indicators and the distribution of marginal effective rates across 
alternative tax-benefit systems, the latter being taken as an indicator of the disincentives and 
distortions caused by these systems. A more rigorous treatment can be used once a behavioural 
model has been specified. This is discussed below in the case where the behaviour of interest is 
labour supply.  
The specification of labour supply behaviour implicitly refers to preferences represented by 
some utility function, as in (7)-(8) above.  With the same notations, let V(wi, y0i; zi; β, εi; γ) be 
the corresponding indirect utility function for individual i.  The social welfare function 
(SWF(γ)) corresponding to a tax-benefit system with parameters γ may then be defined as: 
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where n is the number of agents in the population and G[] is the social valuation of individual 
welfare. G[] is an increasing and concave function, its concavity being an indication of the 
level of aversion towards inequality of the redistribution authority.   
Following a methodology proposed by King (1983), it is often convenient to replace the 
indirect utility function V ( ) by a money metric, ye, defined as the non-labour income that must 
be given to the agent in some benchmark situation to raise his/her utility to the level actually 
achieved with a given policy. More precisely, use as a benchmark the case where the individual 
does not work because his/her productivity is too low – say zero – and the tax-benefit system is 
                                                 
18 Rather satisfactory results have been obtained in that direction by Todd and Wolpin (2002) and Attanasio et al. 
(2003). 
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defined by the set of parameters 0γ . Let );,;;,( 0 γεβ iiiii zywVV =  be the utility 
actually achieved by individual i when the parameters of the tax-benefit system is γ .  Then, a 
money metric )( ie Vy  of iV  using the tax-benefit system
0γ  and the case 0=iw  as a 
benchmark, is given by the solution to the equation:  
[ ] iiiie VzVyV =0;,;);(,0 γεβ .   (16) 
The social welfare function may then be defined on the money metric of utility, rather than on 
the utilities themselves:  
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where )(Γ may now be given the usual interpretation of the social utility of individual 
'income'. The obvious advantage of that transformation of the initial expression of social 
welfare is that it does not depend any more on the cardinalization of the utility function used to 
represent individual preferences.19 
Within such a framework, it is possible to perform comparative social evaluation of alternative 
redistribution policies, as summarized by sets of parameters γA and γB.    This only requires 
being able to compute the indirect utility functions for each individual i in the population, 
inverting it as in (16) thanks to some numerical algorithm, and evaluating the social welfare 
SWF associated to each system20. 
Equipped with a numerical algorithm that computes the social welfare associated with a tax-
benefit system, it becomes possible to consider the issue of optimizing the redistribution, fully 
taking into account the trade-off between equity and efficiency.  The relevant reference here is 
the optimal taxation literature and the pioneering work of Ramsey (1927) and Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) for indirect taxation, and Mirrlees (1971) for direct taxation. Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1980) and Tuomala (1990) offer extensive syntheses of that literature.  
Behavioural msm and the computation of social welfare according to the equations above make 
possible some simple application of that literature. The simplest application consists of 
comparing two tax-benefit systems, as characterized for instance by two sets of parameters, γA 
                                                 
19 An inconvenient is that the equivalent income function is not guaranteed to be concave, which means that, if the 
function Γ( ) is not concave enough, the SWF could favour inequality increasing transfers. Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1988) show that this will not be the case if the individual utility function is quasi-homothetic. 
20 See, for example, Aaberge et al. (1998a), (1999), (2000), (2001). 
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and γB, and to determine which system leads to the highest level of social welfare. Of course, 
the comparison makes sense only if the budget of the redistribution authority is the same in the 
two systems, that is if tax receipts net of transfers are the same with γA and γB. This corresponds 
to the standard 'government budget constraint' in optimal taxation models. An example of this 
approach is provided by Spadaro (2005), where the 1995 French and British tax-benefit 
systems are micro-simulated respectively on samples of French and UK households in order to 
find which system is the 'best' for a given level of social aversion to inequality and for each 
population. As usual in this type of work, the constant net tax receipt constraint is taken care of 
through the introduction in one of the two systems of an artificial tax that is assumed to be 
strictly proportional to incomes and ensures budgetary equivalence across the two systems. 21   
A very similar type of application consists of investigating the effects of modifying some 
subset of the parameters, γ, of a tax-benefit system and to see whether this improves the social 
welfare function, allowing, of course, for constant government budget. If this exercise is 
repeated for a broad enough set of alternative definitions of the social welfare function, this is 
equivalent to investigating 'Pareto-improving' reforms of the initial tax-benefit system. Ahmad 
and Stern have pioneered this type of application of msm's in the case of indirect taxation – see 
in particular Ahmad and Stern (1984).  
The preceding approaches may be seen as a kind of discrete approach to the original optimal 
taxation theoretical models. An approach closer to those models would consist in optimizing a 
tax-benefit system with respect to some subset of its parameters, γ, across some permissible 
range. In effect, this was the approach developed by Stern (1976) when applying Mirrlees' 
model to a linear income taxation model.22 The difference with what could be done today with 
msm is that Stern focussed on hypothetical distributions of individual labour productivities 
rather than the actual ones, and on hypothetical representations of labour supply behaviour, 
rather than accurate econometric estimates of that behaviour. Oddly enough, however, there 
does not seem to be many recent attempts at using existing behavioural msm in that way. Is it 
because such an approach necessarily relies on the specification of a single social welfare 
                                                 
21 See, for instance, Bourguignon et al. (1997). A proportional income tax is being used as the closest 
approximation to a 'neutral' tax that would take care of the budget constraint without major distortions of the 
economy. Practically, however, a proportional tax on income or consumption has an effect on labour supply. 
Iterating with the whole msm is thus necessary to determine the level of the tax rate that will satisfy the budget 
constraint.  
22 See also Slemrod et al. (1994) for an extension to a two tier linear income taxation model. See also Judd et al. 
(2000) for a computational approach to dynamic optimal taxation.  
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function, which is essentially debatable? Or because econometric estimates of labour supply 
behaviour in existing msm are simply too imprecise?  
Applying the original models of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) and Mirrlees (1971) 
without functional restrictions to actual msm raises major difficulties when the heterogeneity 
among individuals or households is multi- rather than uni-dimensional. Indeed, households 
differ not only by their consumption of various goods or their wage rate but also by some 
socio-demographic characteristics which create differences in the utility they draw from a 
given level of consumption, or in non-labour income. These difficulties come on top of the 
need to ground optimal taxation on the choice of a specific social welfare function. This 
explains the limited use of optimal taxation analysis in the applied public finance literature.   
Another way of using the original optimal taxation models consists of having them reveal the 
social welfare function implicit in the observed tax-benefit system, given labour supply and 
consumption behaviour. This is known as the 'optimum inverse' problem and was first analyzed 
in economics by Kurz (1968). For indirect taxation, one can go back from the observed 
structure of tax rates across goods and services to the weight of individual households in the 
social welfare function, depending on their structure of consumption, and under the assumption 
that the observed indirect taxation system is indeed optimal.  For direct taxation, it is also 
possible to identify the weight of individual households in the social welfare function and to 
test whether this weight is both positive and decreasing with income, as assumed in the optimal 
taxation model.  Christiansen and Jansen (1978) used that approach to study the Norwegian 
indirect tax system, whereas Ahmad and Stern (1984) showed that the 1979-80 Indian indirect 
tax system could not be Pareto optimal and derived from the optimum inverse approach 
directions for Pareto-improving reforms. More recently, Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2003) 
used the same type of method to study the Greek indirect tax system. Bourguignon and 
Spadaro (2002) analyzed the redistribution system in France, UK and Spain using the optimum 
inverse approach based on the Euromod msm, and a calibrated model of labour supply.  They 
found that revealed social preferences satisfy the usual regularity assumption – positive and 
decreasing marginal social welfare of individual utility – as long as the wage elasticity of 
labour supply is below some threshold. For Spain and UK, this threshold seems reasonably 
above the range of available econometric estimates of the wage elasticity of labour supply. In 
the case of France, however, the threshold is much lower, so that it cannot be ruled out that 
revealed social preferences are non-Paretian beyond some income level. Using the same type 
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of method, Oliver and Spadaro (2004) analyse how the 1999 reform of the income tax in Spain 
may be interpreted as resulting from a change in social preferences with respect to inequality. 
 
4. Extensions and directions for future research 
The micro-simulation approaches to the evaluation of redistribution policies discussed above 
were defined within a partial equilibrium and static framework. However, redistribution 
policies may have powerful general equilibrium effects, for instance by modifying the sectoral 
structure of the economy in the case of indirect taxation. They may also affect the whole 
lifetime budget constraint of people and therefore some important decisions in their life-cycle. 
Several extensions of the basic arithmetical and behavioural msm have been proposed or are 
being researched so as to cover these important dimensions of redistribution policies. This final 
section briefly outlines them.  
- Micro-macro modelling and microsimulation 
A promising direction of research is the integration of macro models and msm, the so-called 
'micro-macro' approach to modelling. Numerous economy-wide models, particularly the so-
called Computable General Equilibrium models23, already incorporate several 'representative 
households' which are used to analyze the distributional effects of economy-wide policies, and 
possibly the indirect, general equilibrium effects of redistribution policies. The full integration 
of economy-wide modelling and msm consists of replacing these 'representative households' by 
actual households as they are observed in standard household surveys. Several attempts have 
been made in that direction that we briefly summarize in what follows.  
- Top-down approaches  
The simplest linkage between economy-wide modelling and the msm approach proceeds in a 
top-down way. A policy is simulated at the macro-level, based on some aggregate 
representation of household behaviour, possibly using representative households.  The 
simulated changes in prices, wage rates, and self-employment incomes are then passed down to 
a micro-simulation module as in arithmetical msm. In other words, the welfare effects of 
changes in prices and wage rates are computed according to the envelope theorem for all 
                                                 
23 See Showen and Walley (1984). 
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households in a micro-data base. An excellent example of this approach is the analysis of the 
distributional consequences of China's accession to WTO by Chen and Ravallion (2003).24  
There are two drawbacks with the preceding linkage of arithmetical msm to an economy-wide 
modelling tool. The first is that the envelope theorem is based on the assumption that all 
markets are perfectly competitive. The second is that possible economy-wide feedback effects 
of the distributional consequences of a given policy are not taken into account25.  
Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2004) generalized the preceding approach to the case 
where the labour market is imperfect and some individuals are rationed out of formal 
employment, or out of employment all together. In effect, they combine a CGE model, where 
wages are assumed to be rigid in the formal sector of the economy, with a msm that includes 
'behavioural' features. However, the behaviour being modelled there is more the way in which 
rationing does occur on the labour market than the way in which individual agents freely 
decide about the sector they want to work in, on the basis of observed remuneration rates on 
these markets. The main macro-micro linkage thus is the extent of rationing in the labour 
market and the main use of the msm is to select those households or individuals who will 
actually be barred out of, or let in, the formal sector. In the application considered in that paper, 
it turns out that the selectivity of labour-market rationing is the channel through which 
economy-wide policies have the most distributional impact.26  
-Fully integrated micro-macro models 
The second weakness of the top-down micro-macro approach is of course the absence of 
feedback from the micro to the macro level. Several attempts have now been made to fully 
integrate a behavioural msm into an economy-wide modelling framework. For instance, Gortz 
et al. (2000) studied the effect of changing opening hours of retail trade in Denmark based on 
an estimated micro model of time allocation behaviour covering 2000 households. Rutherford, 
Tarr and Shepotylo (2003) analyzed the effect of Russia's accession to WTO based on a model 
that included the consumption and labour supply behaviour of 50,000 households. Cogneau 
and Robilliard (2001) also built an integrated model where some 3,000 Malagasy households 
                                                 
24  It is true that, by emphasizing changes in relative prices and in the sectoral structure of the economy, this 
approach is more adapted to developing than developed countries. Yet, there also are applications to developed 
countries – see for instance Meagher (1993) for Australia. See also the survey on poverty and trade by Hertel and  
Reimer (2004).  
25 A nice application of an integrated micro-macro analysis is Labandeira, Labeaga  and Rodriguez (2004). 
26 See also Bussolo and Lay (2003). 
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have to allocate their labour to different uses and sectors along the lines of the well-known 
model by Heckman and Sedlacek (1990) and make consumption choices across different goods 
and markets. In a dynamic setting, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998), Townsend (2002) and 
others were also able to fully integrate a representation of the labour supply, training and 
saving behaviour of a heterogeneous population, as observed in household surveys, and macro 
equilibrium mechanisms in the economy. 27 
Increasing computational power will of course make such integrated micro-macro approaches 
more and more easy to implement. At the same time, the implementation of these methods 
raises difficult questions about the way micro behaviour is modelled and, in particular, the way 
in which individual heterogeneity is entered in the analysis. For instance, it turns out that it 
makes very much difference whether heterogeneity in preferences is introduced as an additive 
term in conventional consumption or labour supply functions, or as idiosyncratic price, wage or 
income elasticities.  In the first case, experience seems to show that there is little difference 
between the top-down and the fully integrated approach – see Hertel and Reimer (2004). This 
is not true anymore in the second case, as discussed in Browning, Hansen and Heckman 
(1999).  
- Introducing dynamics   
Much of what precedes about the possible linkage between micro and macro phenomena refers 
to a static framework.  This may often seem inappropriate. Transferring income among agents 
at a given point of time is not the only function of redistribution systems. They are also 
responsible for transferring income from a period to another or from a given state of the world 
to another for a given person. This is, for example, the function of pension systems or 
unemployment and health insurance schemes. Likewise, economy-wide policies with some 
distributional impact may affect people in a way that depends on where they stand in their life-
cycle. The microsimulation of these policies thus requires the adoption of a dynamic or “life 
cycle” perspective.   
One could think that the basic typology of static msm, and in particular the arithmetic-
behavioural and the partial-general equilibrium distinction, would apply to dynamic msm. This 
is not totally true, however. For instance, a dynamic arithmetical msm should logically rely on 
                                                 
27 Top-down and fully integrated micro-macro models are not really exclusive. In particular, one may think of 
resolving fully integrated models in a iterative way going from the macro equilibrium of markets to micro 
behaviour and then back to the economy-wide model after aggregating total consumption or labour supply at the 
micro model. See Savard (2003) and Aaberge, R., U. Colombino, E. Holmøy, B. Strøm and T. Wennemo (2004).  
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the observation of sequential data about individual characteristics like income, employment 
status, household composition, etc.. . In other words, it should rely on some kind of 'panel 
data'. However, such data frequently are not available. Moreover, they necessarily are 
historically dated, and, consequently, may not be of very much relevance for simulating the 
forward-looking effects of a change in policy. Rather than relying on actual panel data, 
dynamic arithmetical msm thus generally rely on 'synthetic' panel data that simulate individual 
trajectories in the economic and social space. They are generally obtained by applying to a 
cross-section of individuals and households observed at a point of time in a household survey, 
transition probabilities from a set of individual characteristics to another. These probabilities 
thus generate individual demographic and economic characteristics in the next period and this 
procedure is repeated sequentially until reaching the time horizon selected for the analysis, or 
possibly until the individual is simulated as exiting the sample of observations, as in the case of 
death or retirement. Transition probabilities themselves are obtained from different sources. 
They are assumed to be constant, so that the society is supposed to be in some kind of steady 
state and they are supposed to be independent of the policy being analyzed.   
In a dynamic setting, arithmetical msm thus necessarily incorporate some kind of modelling in 
order to generate synthetic panel data on which changes in redistribution policies may be 
applied28.  Practically, if the socio-economic state of an individual can be described by a vector 
of characteristics, Xt, the idea is to update this vector to the period t+1 according to some 
exogenous stochastic processes obtained from the appropriate data29. For instance, a person 
may become unemployed with a probability Pt that depends on his/her characteristics Xt. 
Likewise, he/she may die, get sick, marry or divorce, have children, receive some inheritance, 
move from a wage bracket to another, etc… The probabilities of these various events taking 
place between time t and t+1 may be given jointly, or they may be assumed independent of 
each other.   
Once such a 'synthetic' panel data set has been put together, it is a simple matter to simulate the 
effect of changing some particular features of tax-benefit systems, like unemployment 
insurance, child benefits or the way in which the pension system works. Such models are now 
being used in a number of countries (DEMOGEN in Canada, SFB3 in Germany, Dynastie in 
France, etc..) . One precaution that is not always taken when using these synthetic data is that 
                                                 
28 On dynamic microsimulation of household behaviour, see Harding [1993], O’Donoghue (1999) and Zaidi and 
Rake (2001). See also Dupont, Hagneré and Touzé (2003) for a survey on dynamic msm applied to pensions 
system analysis. 
29 Caldwell (1990), page 5. 
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they result from a random drawing procedure, which means that the result of any micro-
simulation is itself a random variable.  For this reason, it is important, when analyzing the 
results of a microsimulation, to perform robustness analysis using Monte-Carlo or 
bootstrapping methods (see Bradley and Tibshirani, 1993).        
In a dynamic behavioural msm, the transition probabilities, Pt, should partly become 
endogenous and reactive to the intertemporal budget constraint faced by agents. Depending on 
what is the behaviour of interest and the parameters of interest in the tax-benefit system, the 
analyst should thus model the decision making process on labour supply, consumption, 
savings, marriage, fertility, etc., in function of the budget and other constraints faced by the 
agent, and his/her expectations about future prices, wages and truly exogenous transition 
probabilities30.  
This type of models is still relatively scarce in the literature, very much because of their 
inherent complexity and, in particular, the difficulty of dealing dynamically with uncertainty, 
expectation formation, and market imperfections.  Available models tend to concentrate on 
some specific behaviour, abstracting from other important components of the demo-economic 
life-cycle. For instance, Townsend (2002), Townsend and Ueda (2003), Giné and Townsend 
(2004) concentrate on saving/investment behaviour under uncertainty and in different financial 
market environments, whereas Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) focus on schooling and 
training behaviour. Although important in their own right, such models are specialized and do 
not permit analyzing tax-benefit systems in all their dimensions.  
Extending these models to a general equilibrium setting requires assumptions about the way in 
which expectations are formed. Perfect foresight is generally assumed but equilibrium 
resolution may be difficult. The models already cited are among the few examples of integrated 
dynamic micro-macro models available at this stage. Yet, it seems likely that dynamic msm 
will become more numerous in the future. A key reason for that is that they are the only tools 
that allow for the satisfactory analysis of many policy issues that are today in the agenda of any 
government: demand for tertiary education, savings behaviour and role of the financial sector, 
pensions and population aging, health, etc.  
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                 
30 Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) and Blundell and McCurdy (1999) contain an excellent discussion 
about these problems. See also Klevmarken (1997). 
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This brief survey has shown that micro-simulation techniques have now become relevant 
practically for the whole of applied economic policy analysis. The increasing availability of 
large and detailed micro datasets and the foreseeable continuous increase in computing power 
are drastically modifying our approach to the evaluation of policy reforms. Instead of reasoning 
in terms of representative agents and of aggregate models of the economy, we now try more 
and more to take into account the fundamental heterogeneity of agents. By dispensing with the 
very demanding assumption necessary for perfect aggregation of individual behaviours, such 
an approach greatly improves the macro analysis of reforms. At the same time, it permits 
evaluating their full distributional impact. This can easily be done in several instances, under 
the assumption of no behavioural response. Simple micro-simulation tools are easily developed 
on that basis and should be used more systematically.  
Extending the analysis to cover behavioural responses and the potential general equilibrium 
and macroeconomic effects of reforms requires investing more in micro-economic and macro-
economic modelling. Attempts in that direction, briefly described in this survey, show the 
difficulty of that approach but also all the benefits that policy making could draw from this 
kind of instruments.  
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